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Over the past decade, a major portion of empirical economic research 
has been based on what have come to be known as social experiments. 
Primary examples include a series of income-maintenance experiments, a 
housing-allowance demand experiment, several electricity-pricing ex- 
periments, and a health-insurance experiment. Much of our discussion in 
this paper is motivated by the income-maintenance experiments but it 
draws from our experience with the housing-allowance and electricity 
experiments as well. 
The goal of this paper is to set forth general guidelines that we believe 
would enhance the usefulness of future social experiments and to suggest 
ways of  correcting for their inherent limitations. Our conclusion and 
results can be summarized briefly. 
Although the major motivation for an experiment is to overcome the 
inherent limitations of structural econometric models, in many instances 
the experimental designs have subverted this motivation. The primary 
advantages of  randomized controlled experiments were often lost. In 
particular, in large measure it was impossible  to estimate an experimental 
effect using straightforward analysis-of-variance  methods, as a standard 
experimental  design would suggest. Rather, a careful analysis of  the 
results often required  complicated structural models based on strong 
model-specification assumptions, the necessity for which an experiment 
should be designed to obviate. Section 5.1 provides a simple explanation 
of  this goal and is intended to motivate the remainder of  the paper. 
Jerry A.  Hausman is professor  of economics, Massachusetts  Institute of Technology, and 
research associate, National Bureau of  Economic Research. David A. Wise is John F. 
Stambaugh Professor of  Political Economy, John F. Kennedy School of  Government, 
Harvard University, and research associate, National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
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The major complication for the analysis of  the experiments was in- 
duced  by  an  endogenous-sample-selection and  treatment-assignment 
procedure that selected the experimental participants and assigned them 
to control versus treatment groups partly on the basis of  an outcome 
variable whose change the experiments were intended to measure. To 
overcome at the time of  the experimental results’ analysis the complica- 
tions caused by the endogenous sample selection and treatment assign- 
ment required rather complex statistical techniques and detracted greatly 
from the simplicity we believe should be a goal of experimental designs. 
We propose that to overcome these difficulties,  an experimental design 
should as nearly as possible allow analysis based on a simple analysis-of- 
variance model. This would mean that sample selection and treatment 
assignment should be based on randomization and that stratification on 
response variables should be avoided. 
Although complexities attendant to endogenous stratification can be 
avoided, there are inherent limitations of the experiments that cannot be. 
Two major ones are self-determination of participation and self-selection 
out through attrition. But these problems, we believe, can be corrected 
for with relative ease if  endogenous stratification is eliminated. 
Finally, we propose that as a guiding principle, the experiments should 
have as a first priority the precise estimation of a single or a small number 
of  treatment effects. The experiments to  date have in  general  been 
hampered by  a large number of  treatments together with small sample 
sizes so that no single treatment could be estimated accurately. 
Following the motivation in section 5.1, we have elaborated in section 
5.2 these several general guidelines that we believe would enhance the 
effectiveness of  future experiments. The problem of  endogenous strat- 
ification and a way of  avoiding it are set forth in section 5.3. A method of 
correcting for the inherent self-selection problems of social experiments 
is suggested in section 5.4. 
5.1  Unbiased Estimates, Structural Models, 
and Randomization 
Obtaining  unbiased  estimates  is  the major  motivation for  a large 
portion of  econometric theory and for the application of  econometric 
techniques in empirical analysis. Econometricians generally have in mind 
a model of  the form 
(1)  y = f (X,  E)  7 
where X represents measured and E unmeasured determinants of  Y.  The 
goal is to estimate the effects of  the elements of  X  on Y.  A common 
specification off in equation (1) is 
(2)  Y=Xp+E, 189  Technical Problems in Social Experimentation 
where p is a vector of parameters to be estimated, with each element of p 
measuring the effect on Y of a unit change in the corresponding element 
of x. 
The guiding principle for econometricians is that simple estimation 
techniques (e.g., least squares) will yield unbiased estimates of  p if  Xis 
uncorrelated with E. “Unbiased” is understood to mean and is indeed 
defined to mean an unbiased estimate of  the “causal” effect of  X on 
Y-the  understood definition of  p in much, but not all, of  econometric 
analysis. But although the principle is demonstrably true in theory, it is 
often difficult to approximate in practice and its existence impossible to 
verify without reservation. Nonetheless, the goal remains. 
To move toward it, econometricians use two general modes of reason- 
ing. One is economic theory that restricts the function form off, although 
usually only within broad bounds. The other is statistical theory that in 
large part prescribes methods to correct for correlation between Xand  E, 
and thus obtaining unbiased estimates of  f3. The combination of  eco- 
nomic and statistical theory often  leads-at  least in  the abstract-to 
specification and estimation of structural models. Structural models can 
be thought of  as those in which the parameters have a causal interpreta- 
tion, with the concomitant property that if  unbiased estimates of them are 
obtained they also could be given a causal interpretation. But although 
theoretical  prescription of  models and their  empirical estimation can 
restrict the form off, they can do  so only within limits. The estimates must 
be interpreted within the constraints implicit in  the assumptions that 
underlie them. In particular, it is usually not possible to know for sure 
that Xis uncorrelated with E,  or if  not, that corrections have been made 
for correlations that exist. 
A response to this dilemma is to choose selected values of X in such a 
way that they are by design uncorrelated with other determinants of  Y, 
thus allowing unbiased estimation of the corresponding values of  p. This 
technique is randomization, and it is most often employed within the 
context of a randomized controlled experiment. For purposes of exposi- 
tion we shall henceforth use as an example an estimation of the effects of 
income-maintenance plans-taxes  and guarantees-on earnings. 
Suppose that the plan is  T, called the treatment, and that earnings 
depend on T, on other measured variables X, and on unmeasured deter- 
minants E according to 
(3)  Y=PIT+f(X, E). 
If  individuals (more often families) are chosen at  random  from  the 
population and assigned values of  T, in large samples Twill be uncorre- 
lated with E and with X as well. Then simple least-squares analysis-of- 
variance estimation of  the model 
(4)  Y=P,T+rl, 190  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
where r) is equal tofand treated as a disturbance term in this model, will 
yield unbiased estimates of  p. 
The primary motivation for this approach is to circumvent the uncer- 
tainties inherent in the assumptions of structural econometric models by 
constructing Tin such a way that it is uncorrelated with other determi- 
nants of  Y,  thus by construction assuring unbiased estimation of  PI. 
We  have  set forth  these possibly oversimplified ideas to serve as 
background and motivation for our subsequent discussion. In particular, 
it is important to keep in mind the motivation for randomized controlled 
experiments. Although in the large social experiments we believe it is 
impossible to create the theoretical paradigm of  such an experiment, the 
paradigm should serve as a guide to their designs as well as to the analysis 
of  their results-much  as the theoretical goal of  Xs uncorrelated with 
error terms serves as a guide to empirical analysis based on nonexper- 
imental data. We shall argue, for example,  that the use  of  complex 
structural models to analyze the data from social experiments, or ex- 
perimental designs that require such models or depend in large part on 
structural-model assumptions, are often in contradiction to the primary 
motivation for the experiments and thus subvert their intent; they are 
often inconsistent with the raison d’Etre of  experiments. We will elabo- 
rate on this and other general propositions in the next section. 
5.2  General Goals and Guiding Propositions 
With the powerful advantage of hindsight, and aided by our part in the 
analysis of  social experiments to date, we shall set forth several proposi- 
tions that will enhance the value of future experiments. To do this we will 
explain what we believe to be the major inherent limitations of  such 
experiments. The primary ones are self-determination of  experimental 
participation and self-determination of withdrawal from the experiment. 
These limitations can be corrected for, and some suggestions  for doing so 
are contained in the following sections. Other design characteristics of 
the experiments to date unnecessarily complicate their analysis and in 
particular  make  it  much  more  difficult to correct for  their  inherent 
limitations. The primary design feature of  this type is stratification on 
endogenous variables. We will address this question first, then turn to a 
discussion of inherent limitations, and then address other principles that 
we believe should guide future experimental designs. 
5.2.1  Stratification on Endogenous Variables 
As described in the previous section, the reason for an experiment is, 
by randomization, to eliminate correlation between the treatment vari- 
able and other determinants of  the response variable that is under study. 
In  each  of  the  income-maintenance  experiments,  however,  the  ex- 191  Technical Problems in Social Experimentation 
perimental sample was selected in part on the basis of  the dependent 
variable, and the assignment to treatment versus control group was based 
in part on the dependent variable as well. In general, the group eligible 
for selection-based  on family status, race, age of family head, etc.-was 
stratified on the basis of  income (and other variables), and persons were 
selected from within the strata. In the New Jersey experiment, persons 
with incomes greater than  1.5 times the poverty level were excluded 
altogether. In the other experiments, the stratification on income was less 
complete, but as a result a bit more complicated. Assignment to control 
versus treatment group was also based in part on income. Whether the 
outcome of interest is income or hours worked, which is a component of 
income, such a procedure induces correlation between right-hand vari- 
ables, including the treatment effect, and unmeasured determinants of 
income. Thus it is not straightforward to obtain unbiased estimates of 
treatment effects using simple analysis-of-variance  or -covariance tech- 
niques. 
Theoretically, an elaborate analysis of variance procedure that allowed 
for estimation of separate treatment effects within each strata would yield 
unbiased estimates. But because the strata were so numerous, the treat- 
ments so many, and the sample sizes relatively small, this method of 
analysis was impractical because reasonably precise estimates of  treat- 
ment  effects could not be obtained. Thus to correct for endogenous 
stratification  and  treatment  assignment required  rather  complicated 
models (Hausman and Wise 1977, 1979, 1980). 
Analysis of experimental results based on such techniques has at least 
two major shortcomings. First, it is relatively complicated-requiring 
nonlinear maximum-likelihood estimation for example. This is a short- 
coming in itself, but seems especially troublesome in the context of  an 
experiment  one of  whose major advantages presumably is simplicity. 
Second, and more important, it necessitates the imposition of functional- 
form constraints. The models proposed by Hausman and Wise are gener- 
ally structural in spirit, and in particular require distributional assump- 
tions against which the results may not be robust. To correct for endoge- 
nous stratification, for example, requires analysis based on truncated 
distributions in which the distribution assumed is necessarily a key com- 
ponent. Since the primary advantage of  an experiment presumably is to 
lessen or avoid the necessity for such assumptions, it seems contradictory 
to  design experiments  whose effects cannot be  evaluated  accurately 
without them. 
The elimination of stratification on endogenous variables would avoid 
this source of  complication. The most straightforward procedure would 
be to randomly select an experimental group from the population and 
randomly assign these selected to control or treatment status, without 
consideration  of  income or other endogenous  variables. Two major 192  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
objections to such a procedure are cost and political feasibility. Indeed 
the two are not unrelated.  Most seriously considered income-support 
programs are intended to guarantee a minimum income to families who 
would  otherwise  have  relatively  low  incomes.  And presumably  it  is 
primarily this group whose labor supply and earnings would be affected 
by the plan. Nonetheless, it has been difficult to obtain funds for ex- 
perimental programs that guaranteed support for higher-income fami- 
lies, even though under most plans payments to this group would be 
small,  since  their  earnings  would  be  unlikely  to  fall  below  the 
“breakeven” point  at which  payments  are zero. In  addition,  if  it  is 
important to obtain a “good” estimate of  the effect of  the program on 
low-income families, then it is necessary to have a large enough number 
of  low-income families to do so. Of  course a large random sample from 
the population would also provide a large number of low-income fami- 
lies, but larger sample sizes increase the cost of  the experiment. 
We do not present  numbers on the marginal cost of  an additional 
experimental family. Preliminary investigation, however, suggests that it 
is small relative to the fixed costs of running an experiment. Suppose that, 
for whatever reason, it is not feasible to select a random sample from the 
population. We propose in this case that the sample be as random as 
possible. That is, randomly select persons with incomes below a given 
level,  without  endogenous stratification within  this  group.  But  what 
should be the measure of  income that determines eligibility? 
We have proposed in section 5.3-after  a more detailed description of 
the endogenous stratification problem-a  method for selecting the ex- 
perimental group, based on predicted income, in such a way that the 
stratification is not endogenous. 
5.2.2  Inherent Limitations on Random Sample Selection 
We have  argued  that endogenous stratification procedures  unduly 
complicate the analysis of  experimental results and that procedures that 
avoid  such stratification would  be preferable.  Nonetheless,  there are 
inherent limitations on randomization in social experiments. It is surely 
impossible to attain the theoretical paradigm of  a randomized controlled 
experiment. There are at least two major reason for this problem, both 
involving individual self-selection. 
One reason is that persons cannot in general be made to participate 
in an experiment if  selected by  a random procedure.  Some of  those 
randomly selected will participate while others will not. If the individual- 
participation decision is related to the effect that the treatment would 
have on individuals, then the estimated treatment effect will be a biased 
estimate of the effect to be expected if the treatment were instituted as a 
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The 1954 Salk-vaccine experiment provides a good example of  this 
effect. There were two primary versions of  the experimental design. In 
the “placebo control” areas, children who agreed to be inoculated (or, 
more accurately, whose parents agreed to the inoculation) were ran- 
domly assigned to the vaccine group or to the placebo group. In the 
“observed control” area, second-grade children who agreed to inocula- 
tion received the vaccine, while first and third graders served as the 
control group. Selected results are shown in table 5.1. 
Children in the placebo control areas who were not inoculated con- 
tracted polio at a rate of  54 per  100,000. The comparable figure for 
children who participated in the experiment was 81, the rate for those 
who participated and received the placebo.  Similarly in the observed 
control areas, second-grade children who were not inoculated had  a 
substantially lower rate (53), than the rate for the control group (61). 
Thus apparently children who were more likely to contract polio, and 
thus more likely to be helped by the vaccine, were more likely to partici- 
pate in the experiment. This tends to exaggerate the effect of the vaccine. 
For example, one might conclude on the basis of  the vaccinated and 
control groups in the observed control areas that the vaccine reduced the 
rate from 61 to 34. But apparently the rate for all children would have 
been less than 61 without the vaccine. It is of  course apparent from this 
data that the vaccine was effective, regardless of this uncertainty about 
the magnitude of  the effect. But if  the effect had been less clear, this 
self-determination of participation could have led to considerable uncer- 
tainty about desirability of  universal inoculation. 
A similar effect was apparent in the recent housing-allowance-demand 
experiment. Because of  the nature of  the primary experimental allow- 
ance, many families could benefit under the allowance plan only if  they 
Table 5.1  Reported Cases of Poliomyelitis 
All Reported 
Study  Cases per 
Study Group  Population  100,000 




200,745  41 
201,229  81 
338,778  54 
Observed control areas 
Vaccinated  221,998  34 
Controls  725,173  61 
Second graders not inoculated  123,605  53 
Source: (Meier 1978, table 2, p. 11). 194  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
were willing to move. It seems apparent from subsequent analysis that of 
low-income renters who were asked to participate in the experiment, 
those who were less adverse to moving were more likely to participate in 
the  experiment  (see Venti  and Wise  1982). Thus the estimated  ex- 
perimental effect tended to exaggerate the increase in rent that would be 
induced by the allowance where it applied to all low-income renters. 
We have suggested in section 5.4 a procedure that we believe could be 
used to correct for this potential bias, assuming that the self-selection 
cannot be avoided. 
The other form of  self-selection is attrition from the experimental 
sample, once a sample has been selected. Again, the problem is that 
determinants of  dropping out may be related to the experimental re- 
sponse that would otherwise be observed. For example, persons who are 
not affected by the treatment, possibly because they have high incomes 
for example, may be more likely to drop out than those who are affected 
and thus receive higher payments.  This is the problem addressed by 
Hausman and Wise (1979). 
If the experimental design is not complicated by endogenous stratifica- 
tion and assignment, then correction for self-determination of participa- 
tion and attrition would be relatively simple. Indeed correction for both 
simultaneously is quite feasible, and this approach is taken in section 5.4. 
Such  a  correction,  however,  is  much  more  complicated  if  the  ex- 
perimental design is also complicated by endogenous stratification and 
assignment.  This  reinforces  the  proposal  that  such  stratification be 
avoided in favor of  random sampling. Then analysis of  experimental 
results can address complications that are unavoidable without having to 
devote extraordinary effort to correct for complications induced by the 
experimental design. 
5.2.3  Additional Concerns 
A characteristic of experiments to date has been a rather large number 
of  treatments. The income-maintenance experiments, for example, en- 
tailed several treatments defined by  different combinations of  income- 
guarantee levels and tax rates. In none of  the experiments, however, 
were the sample sizes large enough to obtain precise estimates of  the 
effects of  any particular treatment. Thus analysts generally resorted to 
estimation of  a single effect that did not distinguish the various treat- 
ments, or they assumed a structural model that allowed interpolation 
across individuals assigned to different treatments. The more the latter 
procedure was followed, the less consistent the analysis was with the 
motivation for an experiment. That is, it subverted the major goal of 
using random selection and treatment  assignment to circumvent the 
inherent limitations of  hypothesized structural models. 195  Technical Problems in Social Experimentation 
Thus it seems to us that priorities should be ordered in such a way that 
the primary goals of an experiment are met first. The first goal we propose 
should be the estimation of an experimental effect for a treatment. Then 
additional treatments should be added only if  each additional one can 
also be estimated with precision. The proposition is that precise estima- 
tion of the effect of single treatment or the effects of a few treatments is to 
be preferred to imprecise estimates of  many. This we propose should be 
done in such a way that simple analysis of covariance estimates of treat- 
ment effects may be obtained, subject to the limitations on randomiza- 
tion  discussed above and detailed  more  fully below. Thus we  would 
propose an evaluation model of  the form 
Y=alT1+(~2T2+.  . . + (Y~T~+XP+E, 
where the ak  are treatment effects. We propose an analysis-of-covariance 
model because our research (Hausman and Wise 1979) has suggested that 
the use of  exogenous control variables, represented by X,  reduces the 
effect of  attrition on estimated experimental effects; we presume that it 
would be likely to reduce the effect of self-determination of participation 
as well. 
The reader will note the absence of a structural parameterization that 
attempts, for example, to describe income and substitution effects. This is 
because we believe that simple precise estimates of a few effects will be 
more readily understood by  most observers and will thus carry more 
weight in the decision-making process. In addition, if, for policy pur- 
poses, it is desirable to estimate the effects of  possible programs not 
described by treatments, then interpolations can be made between esti- 
mated treatment effects. If the experimental treatments are at the bounds 
of possible programs, then of course this calculation is easier. Although it 
can be argued that structural models are necessary to make interpola- 
tions, we  believe that  for almost any situation we  can think  of, the 
simplicity of, say, linear interpolations far outweigh the possible advan- 
tages of interpolations based on a structural model. At the same time, the 
spirit of  the experiment is maintained. 
If  the experiment is to inform the policy-making process, we believe 
that a single number that can be supported can be more confidently  relied 
on than more complex analysis. That the labor-supply effect of a known 
treatment is 16 percent and not 2 percent, for example, is much more 
important than whether the effect of  a plan close to the treatment is 16 
percent or 17 percent. 
This is not to say that experimental data should not be used to estimate 
structural econometric models. These data can of  course be used like 
other survey data for this purpose. But the experiment should be thought 
of in the first instance as a way to obtain accurate estimates of the effects 196  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
of particular programs. Structural models with parameters estimated on 
survey data could also be used to make such estimates. (Presumably this 
would  be done to a considerable  extent before  an experiment  were 
undertaken, if  for no other reason than to help to inform the choice of 
experimental  treatment or treatments.) In this sense, the experiment 
could be thought of  as checking the accuracy of predictions based on 
analysis of survey data. That is, the experiments should be designed to 
provide a selected number of  points “on” the response surface, defined 
for example by tax rate and guarantee levels. It is rather straightforward 
to check for example the degree to which alternative structural models fit 
these “known” points on the response surface. In short, an experiment 
should be used to avoid the inherent limitations of structural models in 
providing accurate estimates of  the effects of  specified programs. The 
major advantage of experiments should not be lost sight of  in an effort to 
estimate models that will predict the result of any plan. A lack of confi- 
dence in such estimates is the motivation for the experiments. To use the 
experimental data only to provide more such estimates, or to set up the 
experiments in such a way that only such estimates are possible, is to 
travel to Rome to buy canned peas. 
5.3  Endogenous Sampling and Stratification 
As discussed in the introduction above, a major feature of  classical 
experimental design  is  that it  leads  to a  simple  analysis-of-variance 
(ANOVA) model that minimizes the number of maintained assumptions 
implicit in the interpretation of  parameter estimates. That is, the analysis 
is “model free” in two important aspects: (1) In the simplest cases a 
main-effects  ANOVA specification  is  adequate. Questions about the 
need to include, for example,  further right-hand variables-as  in much of 
econometric and statistical analysis-do  not arise. Correct randomiza- 
tion assures that disturbance terms have expectation equal to zero. Also, 
questions  of  functional  form  are absent  because  each  experimental- 
treatment effect is measured by a parameter. (2) Distributional assump- 
tions are kept to a minimum in estimation. While distributions of test 
statistics are certainly used in inference, asymptotic theory may provide a 
reasonably good approximation in many cases.  Classical experimental 
design together with ANOVA offer the opportunity either to eliminate or 
to decrease greatly a major problem that arises in econometric studies 
based on observational, i.e., nonexperimental data.’ 
Yet in many of the social experiments the classical approach has not 
been  followed.  Given  a  limited  experimental  budget  and  a  “target 
1. We do not mean to disregard important problems that still remain.  Questions of 
interactions may still arise, for example. 197  Technical Problems in Social Experimentation 
population,” the designers of the experiments, in concentrating sample 
selection on that part of the population most likely to be affected by the 
treatment policy, induced endogenous sample selection and treatment 
assignment.  The  presence  of  endogenous sampling complicates the 
analysis of the experiment greatly and thus limits our ability to treat other 
problems that arise, in particular, sample self-selection and attrition. 
And possibly as important, it typically forces the analyst to maintain 
distributional  assumptions about  the random variables  under  study. 
These distributional assumptions are not innocuous even in large Sam- 
ples. Significant empirical departures from these assumptions may lead to 
large  biases in  estimation  of  experimental  effects (e.g., Goldberger 
1980). Most importantly, if  the endogenous sampling is ignored in the 
analysis, extremely large biases may  result in estimated experimental 
effects. In this section we will present three examples of  endogenous 
sampling as well as techniques developed to eliminate the problems that 
it creates. We then propose an alternative approach that attempts to 
choose selectively from the target population without inducing endoge- 
nous sample selection. 
The problems associated with endogenous sampling occur because a 
pre-experimental endogenous variable is used in sample selection and in 
treatment assignment. The effect on the estimated treatment effect arises 
because  of  correlation between  unmeasured  determinants of  the re- 
sponse variable in the experimental and pre-experimental periods. These 
time  effects  have  often  been  ignored  in  the  experimental  designs.2 
We  shall  illustrate  the  problem  within  the  context  of  an  ANOVA 
framework, which when generalized to a random-effects specification, 
allows for serial correlation. We consider a single-period experiment with 
one period of  pre-experimental data. 
(5)  Yit = ut  + Pjqt  + pi +  qit ; 
t=1,2;j=l,. . ,J. 
Epi = Eqi, = 0;  V(pJ =  cr; ; 
We have decomposed the disturbance term into a permanent individual 
component pi,  and another component qit  assumed independent across 
time periods.’ The indicator variable Tit  is 1  if  the individual is receiving 
the experimental treatmentj  in period t and zero otherwise. Time effects 
are absorbed into the constant terms u,. The importance of the individual 
2. For a further discussion of  time effects in experimental design, see Hausman (1980). 
3. Of  course with only two periods, this assumption is only a normalization. 198  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
component pi  is given by the correlation p between the disturbance term 
in the two time periods. Such correlations often exceed .5 in econometric 
studies. 
Suppose that the expected cost of  an experimental treatment varies 
across individuals and treatments  as a function of  Yil.  Designers of 
experiments have for this reason used Yi,  in sample selection and in 
treatment assignment. Because of the presence of pi in both periods, the 
endogenous  sampling  and  treatment  assignment  based  on  pre- 
experimental data carries over to the experimental period as well. A 
simple example will help to make the point clear. Suppose we have two 
experimental treatments called generous (G) and not-generous (NG). 
The G treatment is expected to cost more for “high Y”  individuals 
because of  an expected percentage reduction in work effort. Therefore, 
the designer forms two  groups of  individuals based on  Yil.  Low  Yl 
individuals are assigned either the G plan or control status; the high Yl 
individuals receive either the NG plan or control status. But when we use 
ANOVA to analyze the experimental results we see from equation (5) 
that E(pi  I qt)  #  0. Thus, our estimates are biased for the population 
since we have not accounted for the presence of  individual effects that 
persist over time. Since it is unlikely in most economic and social experi- 
ments that p is near zero, substantial biases may arise from endogenous 
sample designs. 
We shall now consider three experimental designs in which endoge- 
nous sampling was used. In the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experi- 
ment any individual whose pre-experimental income exceeded 1.5 times 
the government-set poverty limit was excluded from the sample. This 
sample truncation was used because the major effect of an NIT program 
was expected to be seen on low-income  individuals and families. A simple 
rule was thus used to make the sample resemble the target population. 
Suppose a model like equation (5)  is used to analyze the effects on hours 
worked. Suppose also that individuals’ earnings are low in period one 
either because they have low p or because q1  is negative even though p is 
positive. Low p people with positive ql  have been excluded from the 
sample. The analyst must maintain the assumption that the effect on 
hours worked for the sample combination of  low p and high p people 
(with negative  q) will  represent  the total population  response.  This 
assumption appears unlikely to hold true because we might well expect 
the behavioral response to differ among the low p and high p people. In 
other words, if  we were to change the sample truncation point from 1.5 
times the poverty limit to another level, the estimated experimental effect 
would be likely to change as well. 
In the Connecticut Time-of-Day Electricity Demonstration (TOD; 
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usage in the year prior to the demonstration. Then households in the 
upper quintiles were disproportionately sampled since the electric utility 
correctly thought that their reaction to the introduction of  time-of-day 
electricity rates would have the largest effects on system revenues. 
In  the  Seattle-Denver  Income  Maintenance  Experiment,  (SIME- 
DIME), the Conlisk-Watts framework was used for treatment assign- 
ment. It allowed the expected cost of an experimental treatment cj for 
treatment Ti  to vary with “normal income,” which in practice was closely 
related  to  pre-experimental  income.  Consider  the  Conlisk-Watts 
framework in the regression form. 
(6)  Y=xp+E; 
xi=  (0, . . . ,  0, 1, 0, . . . ,  0); j=  1, J; 
EE=O; 
V(E) = a2z. 
Here  XI denotes  the  control  observations  and  j  =  2,  .  .  .  , 
J  denotes the J - 1 experimental treatments and normal-income clas- 
sifications. The Conlisk-Watts design uses as an optimization criterion 
the minimization of  the variance of  linear function Pfi of  the estimated 
coefficients, subject to a budget constraint. We want to choose ni,  j  = 1, 
J  (the number of individuals in a given row of  the design matrix) in an 
optimal manner. Let D = P‘P. The complete problem is an integer 




min q(nl, . . . ,  n,)  = tr[D,Zlnjx/xj)-’], 
n,rO  for all j. 
For large N = Znj  a suitable approximation is to treat the nj  as continuous 
and to round off  the results to the nearest integer. To estimate the 
experimental effects in each class via the contrasts, fij -  fil, the appropri- 
ate P matrix is an (rn -  1) x m matrix with the first column -  1s and each 
of the remaining columns all zeroes and a single 1.  Thus Pj = [ -  1,  0, . . . , 
0, 1, . . . ,  01. We solve equation (7) to find 
J 
E = [(J -  l)~,  + ,Z  cJ]& 
J=2 
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sample  for  low  cj  individuals.  But  since  cj is  a  function  of  pre- 
experimental income, we see that E(ki  IXj) # 0 which will lead to bias in 
the estimation of  experimental effects. 
We do not want to give the erroneous impression that endogenous 
sampling destroys the possibility of  experimental analysis. In fact, we 
have written several papers addressing the problem (Hausman and Wise 
1976,1977,1980,1981).  And endogenous sampling  can reduce the cost of 
an experiment ~onsiderably.~  But we  emphasize the model functional 
form and distributional assumptions that endogenous sampling requires. 
To illustrate the nature of  these assumptions, we consider again the 
three examples, and for each we discuss possible model specifications. 
1. Sample truncation. In Hausman and Wise 1976 and 1977, models to 
correct  for  sample  truncation  are  developed.  The  approach  taken 
assumes that the earnings conditional on personal attributes are distrib- 
uted log normal. A two-period model is necessary since sample trunca- 
tion was performed on the pre-experimental data. But since the correla- 
tion  of  the  disturbances  across years  (p  in  equation 5)  is  not  zero, 
truncation on pre-experimental  data will  affect the analysis of  the ex- 
perimental results. Therefore, we define a model of  the form 
(9)  yj, = zj,y  +€if;  t = 1, 2; €it = pi + qjt; 
with the usual stochastic assumptions. We assume thatf(yjl,  yi2 Zil,  Zi2) 
is bivariate normal. The Zip  include experimental treatments as well as 
individual characteristics. Then the likelihood can be written 
where $ is the bivariate normal density and O  is the univariate normal 
distribution. For the New Jersey NIT experiment we estimate 6 = .85, 
which demonstrates the potential importance of  correcting for trunca- 
tion. The log normal is a convenient distribution that leads to a likelihood 
function that  is  quite tractable using modern  computers.  Still, if  the 
choice of  log normal is not correct, it represents a specification error. 
An even more difficult problem arises if  we  want to analyze hours 
rather than earnings. Since truncation takes place on earnings we must 
analyze hours and wages jointly, and the four-equation model that results 
leads to a likelihood function considerably more complicated than equa- 
tion (10) (Hausman and Wise 1976,432).  Furthermore, given the identity 
between earnings and the product of  wages and hours, we  must now 
assume that both wages and hours are distributed log normally. Almost 
no other assumptions lead to a tractable likelihood function, even though 
4. Manski and McFadden (1981) consider a similar question in attempting to minimize 
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some evidence exists that hours might be better represented by a con- 
ditional normal distributi~n.~  And lastly, because of  the complications 
induced in the likelihood function by truncation, our ability to handle 
other problems, like sample attrition or taxation, are limited. Thus the 
analysis has been greatly complicated by what seems to be a reasonable 
design criterion, concentrating on the target population of the proposed 
policy. 
2.  Stratification on  the endogenous  variables. To keep the  analysis 
simple we here assume that income has been grouped into two intervals, 
even though in the Gary NIT experiment as well as the Connecticut TOD 
demonstration quintiles were used. Assume that below some level L,  an 
unknown proportion of a random sample of  the population is sampled, 
P,, and above L,  a proportion P2.6  Then the density function is 
where  f is  the  normal-density  function  N(Zp, u2). Only  the  ratio 
P  = P2/P1  can be identified. Therefore, we divide through the expres- 
sions in equation (11)  by P1.  Again using normality assumption fory, and 
assuming N1  persons with y 5  L and N2  with y > 1, the log likelihood 
function is 
N1  N1 
L = 2  In f(yi)  -  ,X  In [ai  + P(1- ai)] 
+ 2,  In P+ 2. lnf(yi)  -  .Z  In [ai  + P(l- ai)] 
i=  1  1=1  (12) 
N2  N2  N2 
i=l  i=  1  1=1 
N  N 
i=l  1-1  =  X  lnf(yi)  -  .X  In (Pf  (1 -  P)ai)  +N2  In P, 
where  =  [(L -  Zip)].  Again, a maintained distributional assump- 
tion is necessary and a rather complicated maximum-likelihood problem 
is presented. Furthermore, when we want to do a two-period analysis or 
consider other problems, our ability to do so is limited by  the rapidly 
increasing complications induced by the stratification on the endogenous 
variable. 
3.  Treatment assignment using an endogenous variable. Our last exam- 
ple is the SIME-DIME NIT experimental design. Here seven income 
5. The opportunity  to do any type of  nonparametric analysis is severely limited here 
6. If P, and P2 are known, the analysis can be simplified somewhat. See Hausman and 
because we do not have observations on the part of  the sample that was truncated. 
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intervals, called “E-levels,” were used to define rows in the Conlisk- 
Watts design framework of  equations (6)-(18).  The costs ci were then 
derived as a function of E-level. The expected cost of  a treatment was 
presumed to rise with E-level because it was assumed that tax revenues 
would decline and that NIT payments would increase. The result was that 
no one in the highest E-level interval was assigned treatment status; all 
were assigned to be controls where, of course, the cost does not grow with 
E-level. Furthermore, in general, persons with higher E-levels were more 
likely to be assigned to experimental treatments with more generous 
support levels. Thus, treatment assignment was based on an endogenous 
variable-pre-experimental  income-which  was highly correlated with 
the response variable during the experiment. 
Treatment assignment using endogenous variables does not in theory 
prevent the use of ANOVA in the analysis phase of an experiment. What 
is needed, however, is an elaborate specification  allowing a separate p in 
equation (5) for each E-level and treatment or control assignment. But in 
the SIME-DIME experiment, for example, including manpower treat- 
ments, there would be J  = 59 columns in the X matrix. In fact, if  full 
ANOVA were done without deleting higher-order interactions as did the 
design model, J would exceed 200. Thus even for the comparatively large 
sample sizes as in the SIME-DIME, we  cannot hope to obtain precise 
estimates of experimental effects. And when other factors such as race 
and city are added to the analysis, full ANOVA estimation becomes 
hopeless. Thus we are left with estimating ANOVA specifications with 
many  fewer parameters  than  the experimental  design  requires. One 
approach is to enter E-level as a right-hand-side variable in linear form. 
But we immediately lose the model-free aspect of ANOVA since correct- 
ness of functional form becomes an issue. In fact, a linear specification  of 
E-level is not totally appropriate since it does not remove all correlation 
between the treatment variable and the stochastic disturbance. 
Again, a model of treatment assignment can be constructed, as spec- 
ified by  Hausman and Wise 1980. But since treatment assignment is a 
zero-one outcome, a probit model (or logit model) is required along with 
the necessary distributional  assumptions. An additional complication 
arises here because we must specify the partly unknown model of  treat- 
ment assignment correctly.’ Thus, both distributional assumptions and 
functional-form assumptions are required for model estimation.  The 
resulting likelihood function used in estimation is even more complicated 
than  equations (10)  and (12). And  as emphasized above, additional 
complications like sample attrition are almost impossible to treat jointly 
with the sample-assignment issues. 
7. The unknown aspect arises because there does not exist a straightforward model for 
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A simple solution exists to these design and analysis problems. Ran- 
domize over pre-experimental income. Then problems of  endogenous 
assignment or stratification do not occur, so ANOVA specifications again 
are appropriate. But in making such a choice, we give up the notion of  a 
target population; so the precision of  our analysis for a particular group 
may decrease, given size and experimental budget. Or to state the prob- 
lem in an alternative manner, for a given level of precision in estimation, 
the necessary budget for an experiment might increase substantially. 
An alternative approach is to stratify on exogenous variables only and 
to approximate the goals of endogenous stratification by using predicted 
values of the endogenous variable.8 
We shall consider the first example, sample truncation, since the issues 
can be seen quite clearly. Figure 5.1 represents the density of  earnings 
with a truncation point T.9  Suppose our aim is to sample people in the 
area of the distribution marked I. Now instead of using pre-experimental 
income with its associated problems, consider the use of  “exogenous” 
income stratification, based on income predicted on the basis of exoge- 
nous variables, say from the regression equation 
(13)  Yi=Zis+€i, 
where the prediction is 
Fi  = zis = zis + z(z’z)-lz’€. 
Note that ei still enters the last term through the product Zi’  ei . But for a 
sample of size N this term is of order 1/N,  so it quite rapidly disappears as 
the sample becomes large. The variables included in Zi  would be educa- 
tion, training, union membership, age, etc. We could then base trunca- 
tion, so problems that arise from the individual effect pi =  -  qit  being 
present in both periods no longer occur. 
If  the covariance between yi  and jji were very high, we  would have 
solved the problem. Then the predicted value would do almost as well as 
the actual  endogenous variable.  But  for  log  earnings the R2 of  the 
regression is around .25; multiple correlation coefficients  in the range of 
.25  to .60  are quite common for many cross-sectional regressions in 
econometrics. Thus, if we use ii  < F  as the truncation point, we expect on 
average to do about 1.2 as well as pure random sampling in selecting 
While this is an improvement, we might do even better by choosing a 
point k <  L as our sample truncation point. Perhaps a useful approach to 
yi < L. 
8. This approach  was employed in the design of a survey for electricity  use in Vermont by 
Hausman and Trimble (1981). 
9. We are assuming a common truncation point, although in the NIT experiment it 
depended on family sue, which partly defines the poverty limit. But we can add varying 
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Fig. 5.1  Selection based on an exogenous variable. 
the choice of  k can be constructed as follows. Assume the benefit to 
estimation of  the experimental effect has expected value of  the form 
V(yi)  = f3 / (yi  -  p)2.  That is, we expect to learn little about labor-supply 
response  from  low-income or high-income  individuals.  On the other 
hand, cost is expected to grow linearly with income c(yi)  = cyi.  Suppose 
we want to solve for the optimum truncation point k,  given our knowl- 
edge that since we are using predicted income ji,  the actual yi  = ji  + ei 
will differ. The optimization problem is 
(14)  = yi -  ei 5  k. 
We solve the corresponding expected value problem 
mp  f3/(yi -  p)’,  s.t. Zcy, 5  C, 
max L = E(p/(ji  + ei  -  7)’)  + XIE(C -  Cc(ji  + ei)) 
k  (15) 
+ h2( k -  ji). 
The form of the solution can be seen by assuming that the variable has 
been transformed to make the residuals approximately normal and that 
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where u  is the standard deviation of the residual distribution. The first- 
order conditions of  equation (16) are straightforward, and the problem 
can be solved straightforwardly on a computer since the constraint will be 
satisfied with equality and all the functions are monotonic in k. In this 
problem the gains over random sampling increase as the variance of the 
residuals decreases, so yi  and ji  are more highly correlated as we would 
expect. If  the correlation becomes very small, we will be quite close to 
random sampling. But in many cases random sampling  may be preferable 
to endogenous sampling, which as we have attempted to show, can lead 
to difficult problems in the analysis phase of  an experiment. 
5.4  Self-Determination of Participation and Attrition 
We have addressed in the previous sections a problem largely induced 
by experimental design, a problem that should be avoided. In this section 
we will  address a major potential problem that cannot in general be 
avoided but that can be corrected for without undue complication, as 
long as it is not accompanied by induced endogenous stratification. 
Suppose it were possible to select a random sample of families  from the 
population, or from a subset of the population (say with predicted income 
below a certain level). Of the families selected at random, some, when 
asked to participate in the experiment, will do so, while others will elect 
not to participate. Even though a random sample is identified, those who 
choose to participate may not represent a random sample. In experiments 
to date no systematic record has been kept of who, when asked, partici- 
pates and who does not. Thus it has not been possible to identify system- 
atic differences (and in particular unmeasured ones) between those who 
participate and those who do not; of course, if  differences existed, there 
has been no way to correct for them. In the income-maintenance experi- 
ments, for example, a procedure like the following was used.  Each 
experiment was conducted within a single city or a small number of cities. 
All  families within  the city or within  some section of  the city were 
canvassed to locate those with a few predetermined characteristics. In 
these experiments, income, race, age of  family head, and number of 
dependents were attributes that determined eligibility. Those who were 
found to meet the eligibility criteria were asked to enroll in the experi- 
ment. Of those who did enroll, some were assigned to a treatment group 
and others to a control group. It is the enrollment decision that concerns 
us here. 
Suppose that instead of using a procedure like the above, we were to 
begin with an external source of  data on families. The U.S.  census is a 
logical choice. Census data provide information on family income, race, 
one or two parents in a family, education of  family head, number of 
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sented by  a vector of  characteristics X. From families surveyed by the 
Census Bureau, a random sample could be chosen. 
For simplicity, suppose the goal is to estimate a single-treatment effect. 
Ideally we would like to randomly assign part of  this randomly selected 
sample to a control group and others to the treatment group. Then after 
some time period, we would like to compare controls and experimentals, 
with Y the outcome of  interest, using a simple analysis of variance model 
of  the form 
(17)  Yi  = Po + PITi  + ~i, 
where Ti is an indicator variable with the value 1  for experimentals and 0 
for controls. 
But suppose not all of the random sample agrees to participate. Sup- 
pose participation depends on X  and a random disturbance term q  in the 
following way: 
(18)  Pi  = Xilx  + qi, 
where Pi is an unobserved index variable with the property that individual 
i agrees to participate if  Pi > 0. If  Yi  and Pi are jointly normal with 
correlation coefficient p ,  and q  is normalized to have variance 1,  we know 
that the expected value of  Yi  ,  given that individual i enrolls is given by 
Suppose that p1  is estimated by least squares using the sample of partici- 
pants and ignoring the last term in equation (3). Let the inverse Mills 
ratio +  (.) / CP  [a]  be represented by Mi.  According to standard excluded- 
variable arguments, if  M is correlated with T,  the least-squares estimate 
of  p1 will be biased. As the sample of  participants becomes large, the 
least-squares estimate goes to 
where pMTis the correlation between M and T.  If the treatment indicator 
T,  however, is assigned randomly, then it will be uncorrelated with Xand 
thus with M which is a function of X.  Under these simple assumptions, 
the least-squares estimate of  the treatment effect will be consistent, as 
long as the assignment to control versus treatment groups is random. 
Each participant could be randomly assigned, or each of  those in the 
census sample could be randomly assigned prior to enrollment, as long as 
at the time of  enrollment, prospective participants did not know their 
assignment. 
But the model as set out above hides by  omission a potential major 
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all persons in the population, the responses would vary among them. It is 
clear that this is indeed the case (even after controlling for measured 
family characteristics). It seems plausible that the decision to participate 
will depend on the potential response. For example, it is often hypothe- 
sized that persons whose behavior is most likely to be affected will be 
most likely to participate, even though they do not know prior to enroll- 
ment whether they will be in the treatment or in the control group. This is 
the essence of  the examples given in section 1.2.2. 
The idea may be represented by a random-effects model of  the form 
(21)  Yi = Po + (Pi + bJTj + ~i  = Po + PlTi + biTi + ~i, 
where from the perspective of  the analyst, b is random with mean 0. 
Using (21), the expected value of  Yi  among participants is given by 
In this case, it is clear that the least term will be correlated with Ti,  and a 
least-squares estimate of  p1  would be biased. 
Joint maximum-likelihood estimation of (18) and (21), however, could 
be used to obtain a consistent estimate of  PI. The procedure is similar to 
the one proposed by Hausman and Wise (1979), except that the equa- 
tions pertain to the response variables and participation, rather than to 
the response variable and attrition. In this case, there are two possible 
outcomes: Individual i doesn't participate with probability, 
(23)  1 -  @[Xi.],  = Pli , 
or individual i participates with response Yi,  with likelihood 
The likelihood function 
N1  N2 
L = .c In Pli+ c 1,  P2i  (25)  r=l  i=  1 
can easily be maximized to obtain estimates of  P along with the other 
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The other component of  self-selection that seems unavoidable in social 
experiments is attrition. Some participants will inevitably drop out of  the 
experiment before the treatment response is measured. To take advan- 
tage of  individual specific characteristics that persist  over  time, it is 
advantageous to observe participants for some period of  time before the 
treatment becomes effective. This will lead to four equations of  the form 
(26)  Pj = xia +  Eli , 
Y,i = x,is + €2i, 
y2i=xzis+ plT+€3i, 
Ai  = Xi  y + eqi , 
Where Y1  pertains to the response variable before the treatment period, 
Y2  to the response variable during the experimental period, and A is an 
unobserved indicator variable with the property that individual i leaves 
the experiment, if Ai  <  0. This system of equations can also be estimated 
readily with  available maximum-likelihood techniques  (see Venti and 
Wise 1981). 
Comment  John Conlisk 
Endogenous stratification is the main issue discussed by  Hausman and 
Wise. I  have little to say about it because they have said things well. 
Regarding endogenous stratification that can be avoided, as when nega- 
tive-tax experimenters stratify on actual pre-experiment earnings rather 
than on an exogenous earnings-capacity measure, the Hausman and Wise 
advice is very simple: Don’t do it. In my view, the advice is feasible and 
very important--perhaps  the best message of the conference. Regarding 
endogenous stratification that cannot be avoided, as when subjects self- 
select through nonparticipation or attrition, Hausman and Wise describe 
the applicable statistical techniques. 
In addition to analyzing endogenous stratification, Hausman and Wise 
devote substantial attention to other design issues. This other material is 
less clear and less well developed. Roughly speaking, Hausman and Wise 
advocate the simplest kind of classical design-a  fully randomized design 
intended for a one-way analysis of  variance (ANOVA). I have a long 
comment about the randomization advice, a shorter comment about the 
ANOVA advice, and a short concluding comment. 
Randomization 
Consider the kind  of  textbook  example  associated with  a classical 
ANOVA design. Suppose a large number of  planting boxes are to be 
John Conlisk is professor of economics, University of  California, San Diego. 209  Technical Problems in Social Experimentation 
soiled, seeded, cultivated, harvested, and measured in a uniform man- 
ner.  Some of  the boxes, however,  are to be selected at random  for 
application of  a chemical whose effect the experimenter wishes to esti- 
mate. If we think of the plants in a given box as analogous to a family in a 
social experiment, what complications to the example would we add to 
make it more like the social experiment? Here are some possibilities. 
Suppose that  the plants  are at  substantial  and different  stages of 
maturity when the experiment begins, that the number of plants per box 
and the sizes of  boxes vary, that the soil and other nutritional history 
varies, that the experimenter is allowed to apply the chemical and mea- 
sure the effect over only a short duration, that the cost per box varies 
greatly, and that plant biology leads us to expect interaction between the 
treatment (the chemical) and the covariates (plant age, box size, and so 
on). If  plants could walk out on the experimenter, we  could add self- 
selection to the list of horrors. 
Before the conference, my reading of  the Hausman and Wise advice 
was that, despite the complications just listed, the experimenter should 
stick to the simple strategy of full randomization-that  is, no use should 
be made of  the exogenous covariate information in assigning boxes to 
treatment. My  intuition balked at this notion because it sounded like 
throwing away information.  Why not use the covariates at the design 
stage, especially covariates expected to interact with the treatment? At 
the conference, however, I was told that this was a misreading of  the 
Hausman and Wise paper. They did not object to categorizing the boxes 
into strata, or blocks, according to the exogenous covariates. The advice 
was merely that there should be full randomization of  treatment assign- 
ment within a given stratum. This advice, however, leaves me puzzled. If 
a stratum is defined broadly, so that the covariates have a substantial 
range within the stratum (especially covariates expected to interact with 
treatment), my original question remains. Is there no use to be made of 
these covariates in assigning boxes to treatment? If  a stratum is defined 
narrowly so that important covariates are essentially held fixed within a 
stratum, then the estimated treatment effect may be so stratum-specific 
that nothing important can be learned without experimenting at several 
different strata. In this case, the design advice is thoroughly incomplete 
without a discussion of  strata selection and data pooling. 
Whatever the truth about Hausman and Wise’s meaning, the issues 
need clarification. To address the issues more formally, consider a ver- 
sion of  Hausman and Wise’s equation (3), plus an interaction effect. 
(1)  Y = P,T(l+ p2z)-1  + p3z + pa+  E. 
Here Tis the treatment variable; Xand 2  are scalar exogenous variables. 
Consider first the case p2 = p3 = 0. Then 2 drops out, and the model 
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for randomization. For a sizable sample, random assignment of  subjects 
to levels of  T leaves T independent of X and E;  hence the treatment effect 
6Y / 6T = p1  can be estimated from a simple regression of  Yon  T.  No 
serious assumptions about X and E need be made; indeed no data on X 
are needed. X can be viewed as an extraneous nuisance variable whose 
potential for creating econometric problems is neutralized by randomiza- 
tion. 
Now consider the case of p2  >  0 and p4 = 0. Here Xdisappears and the 
exogenous variable to contend with is Z. The treatment effect 
is a function of Z;  for a reason given below, 6Y/  6Tis constructed to go to 
zero as 2  gets large (hence the nonlinearity is p2). Since 6Y / 6T depends 
on Z,  then Z is not simply a nuisance variable. Rather it is a central part of 
the object of  study. It is not surprising that the case for randomization 
unravels when it is Z rather than X  at issue. Random assignment of 
subjects to treatment levels makes T independent of  Z and E, but this 
independence does not buy much. It does not buy off the need for Z data, 
nor does it neutralize econometric problems caused by Z. For example, 
measurement error in  Z  or correlation of  Z with E will, through the 
algebraic interaction of 2  and T,  prevent consistent regression estimation 
of  the treatment parameters p1 and p2. That is, randomization will not 
prevent the need for strong assumptions about Z and E. 
It is thus important to ask whether the exogenous variables in a social 
experiment are more like X or more like Z. To be concrete, consider a 
negative-tax interpretation of  equation (1). Suppose the response vari- 
able Y is an earnings variable (perhaps in logs); suppose T is a guarantee 
level (with the negative-tax break-even point fixed and suppressed); and 
suppose the major  exogenous variable is  some measure of  earnings 
capacity (perhaps constructed as the predicted value from a regression of 
pre-experiment earnings on schooling, age, and other exogenous vari- 
ables). Since we expect the treatment effect to decline toward zero as 
earnings capacity gets to and beyond the break-even income, earnings 
capacity acts like Z in the treatment effect 
That is, earnings capacity is better represented by Z than by Xin  equation 
(1). From the viewpoint of economic behavior, the difference is crucial. 
To omit the interaction between treatment  T and earnings capacity Z 
would be to assume that a negative tax has the same expected influence 
on a surgeon as on an unskilled laborer. More generally, to omit the 
interaction would be to assume that an agent's expected response to an 
economic stimulus is independent of his economic circumstance. Suppose 
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other exogenous variable. It appears to me that all the social experiments 
involve important  exogenous variables that,  like  Z  in  equation (l), 
interact with  treatments.  Since the potential of  Z for creating econ- 
ometric problems cannot be neutralized by randomization, how should 
we interpret the Hausman and Wise advice about randomization? There 
seem to be two cases. 
Case 1 
Perhaps Hausman and Wise are merely saying that, at a fixed value of 
2,  one should randomize so as to neutralize the potential nuisances of X 
and E. That is, define a stratum by  a fixed value Z = Zo (in practice, a 
narrow range for Z),  randomize within the stratum, and estimate the 
stratum-specific treatment effect 
by a simple regression of  Yon T. If  this is the advice, it appears to be 
perfectly logical, but not very helpful. The hard design problems are in 
dealing with Z. Is knowledge of the treatment effect at a single Z value 
enough information to justify the experiment? Probably not. Then how 
many Z values (how many strata) should be chosen, and what should they 
be? Will continuity of  response across Z values be assumed, as in equa- 
tion (l),  to lay a foundation for data pooling across strata? If so, then the 
standard sort of assumptions about Z (independence of E  and so on) must 
be made, despite Hausman and Wise’s desire to avoid them. If  continuity 
in 2 is not assumed, as Hausman and Wise would probably advise, then 
each stratum is in effect a separate experiment; and the multiplicity of 
experiments fragments the effective budget and sample for each. 
Case 2 
Perhaps Hausman and Wise are advising not just randomization at a 
given Z,  but rather randomization across the full range of 2,  either in the 
population or at least up to some sizeable truncation point. Advocacy of 
such “full” randomization is the way  their paper clearly reads to me, 
despite  discussion  at the conference.  As noted  above, however, the 
independence of  T and 2 resulting from full randomization will not 
prevent the need for data on Z or the need for assumptions about Z (such 
as independence of  E).  This absence of a positive case for full randomiza- 
tion should be coupled with the presence of a negative case. Let C(T,Z) 
be the expected cost of one observation at treatment level Tfor a subject 
with earnings capacity 2.  The form of  C(T,Z) may be such that cost 
efficiency in design leads to a correlation between Tand 2.  In addition, if 
a continuous-response function is assumed, as in equation (l),  efficient 
exploitation of  the geometric placement of  available (T,Z)  points may 
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In summary, Hausman and Wise have argued that proper randomiza- 
tion will lead to simple designs and a much reduced need for econometric 
structure. Their argument is not convincing, primarily because it neglects 
interactions between treatments and exogenous variables. Such interac- 
tions are typically central to the behavior studied in social experiments. 
When these interactions, along with cost and geometric considerations, 
are accounted for, I see no reason to suppose that a good design will be 
the sort of simple design Hausman and Wise have in mind, nor do I see a 
useful way to substitute simple rules of  thumb (like randomization  and 
ANOVA  response functions) for a full-blown, optimal design analysis 
specific to the context at hand. 
Response Functional Form 
The issue here is the disagreement between designers who favor some 
sort of  continuous response function and those who favor an ANOVA 
response function (a separate parameter for every point on the response 
function considered). In the many discussions I have heard about the 
response-functional-form  issue, I have never heard anyone claim that 
true response functions are likely to be other than continuous and fairly 
smooth. For example, Hausman and Wise remark in the paper that they 
are willing to estimate unknown points on a response surface by linear 
interpolation between known points. People’s reluctance to impose con- 
tinuity of response seems to be based on the fear that the only way to do  it 
is to make a commitment to some specific functional form, and thus to 
risk an inaccurate outcome if  the specific functional form is wrong. 
This reasoning, in my opinion, is incorrect.  It is possible to impose 
continuity and a degree of  smoothness in a way that is robust to a great 
variety of specific functional forms (see Conlisk 1973).  Handled properly, 
continuity of response is not to  be thought of as an assumption in the same 
league with, say, normality of  residuals. Residual normality is a very 
strong assumption which nearly everyone would have doubts about; it is 
understandable  that  Hausman  and  Wise  wish  to avoid  a  normality 
assumption when they can. Response continuity, however, is a relatively 
weak assumption which everyone believes in; it is not so understandable 
why Hausman and Wise wish to avoid it. The advantage of a response- 
continuity assumption is greater design efficiency. If  an optimal design 
model is “told” that response information gathered at one design point is 
partially transferable to adjacent design points, then the model can pick 
and choose among design points and can thereby get more out of  the 
given design budget. 
In the design phase of  the New Jersey experiment, there was a dis- 
agreement between the Mathematica group, which favored an ANOVA 
response function, and the University of Wisconsin group, which favored 
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curious cross, having the Mathematica assumptions and the Wisconsin 
conclusions. 
The New Jersey design involved nine combinations of  negative-tax 
parameters at each of  three earnings-capacity levels-a  total of  twenty- 
seven treatments. Under the response-continuity assumptions favored by 
the Wisconsin group, the optimal design model (used by both groups) led 
to a concentration  of  observations at many fewer than twenty-seven 
treatments. The design model in effect advised the designers to observe 
the response at a few well-chosen treatments and to infer the response at 
other treatments  by  fitting a response function. Under the ANOVA 
assumption favored by the Mathematica group, the design model led to a 
more even distribution  of  observations across all twenty-seven treat- 
ments; all treatments have to be handled separately when there is no 
response continuity. 
The Hausman and Wise advice might be paraphrased as follows: By all 
means,  assume  an  ANOVA  response  function  (the  Mathematica 
assumption); continuity of response would be uncomfortably restrictive. 
However, to promote precision, keep the number of  treatments small; 
one can always interpolate to other treatments at the experiment’s end 
(the Wisconsin conclusion). Is this more like the Mathematica position or 
more like the Wisconsin position? The answer, I think, is unclear until 
Hausman and Wise complete their advice by describing how they would 
choose their small number of treatments. If  their choice depended in part 
on the ultimate interpolations that data users would surely make, then I 
would view them as assuming response continuity without admitting it. If 
their choice ignored this ultimate use of  the data, I would wonder why. 
Conclusion 
The Hausman and Wise analysis of  endogenous stratification is well 
grounded in formal models presented in this paper and in  their other 
papers. The major piece of design advice, to avoid endogenous stratifica- 
tion when possible, is persuasive and important. 
The remaining design advice, in my opinion, is not well grounded in 
formal models; the arguments strike me as overly casual. Examples: The 
advice to randomize and the simple model to support that advice are of 
little  use  until  the central issue of  treatmenkovariate interaction  is 
formally handled. The advice to avoid restrictive assumptions is of little 
use without a robustness analysis to help distinguish weak from strong 
assumptions. The advice to keep the number of  treatments reasonably 
small is of  little use without a model, involving a cost constraint, that 
defines reasonable smallness. Explicit in the paper’s subtitle (“Cost ver- 
sus Ease of  Analysis”) and implicit in much of the discussion are trade- 
offs forced  by  the  need  to limit  costs; but  no  formal model  of  the 
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tions, but to interpolate at the experiment’s end, has a flavor of  self- 
contradiction that calls for a design model to sort out the logic. A final 
example:  Having emphasized that  nonparticipation  and attrition will 
create a problem in the data analysis, Hausman and Wise argue that this 
problem is an additional reason to stick to a simple classical design. But 
why should a particular problem in the data argue for a design developed 
in contexts not involving that problem? What is needed is an extension of 
design theory to handle nonparticipation and attrition in an explicit way. 
Comment 
Figure 5.1 describes the process of  social experimentation as a series of 
transitions. First, the population is screened to form a subject pool. Some 
subjects are rejected because they fail to meet the screening criteria; 
others are accepted but balk and refuse to participate. Second, there may 
be a period of pre-experimental observation which results in some sub- 
jects being rejected and others dropping out. The retained subjects form 
the  experimental  subject  pool.  This completes the  pre-experimental 
phase of  the study, labeled I on the diagram. Third, the experimental 
subject pool is assigned treatments. The result, after further attrition, is a 
set of complete observations. Fourth, the experimental data are used to 
estimate a model of  the effects of  treatment. Population statistics may 
provide information required to compensate for refusals and attritals. 
Fifth, the estimated model is used to draw policy conclusions. Population 
statistics may be useful for correcting or augmenting statistics for the set 
of complete experimental observations. 
Associated with the transitions in this diagram are probabilities con- 
ditioned on previous events. The likelihood of complete observations is a 
product of  these probabilities.  The analyst maintains hypotheses that 
place these probabilities in suitable parametric families. Then the model 
can be estimated by the method of maximum likelihood or the method of 
moments. 
Design decisions are the choice of  sample frame, which determines 
screening probabilities,  and the choice of  experimental design, which 
determines the conditional distribution of  treatments.  Factors in  the 
design decision are (1) cost, (2) technical or political feasibility, and (3) 
the simplicity and precision of  the statistical model. Given an objective 
function of  these factors, one can in principle chose an optimal design. 
Hausman and Wise have drawn four main conclusions on the design of 
social experiments. First, it is desirable to analyze the effects of  treat- 
ments with a simple ANOVA model embodying a minimum of structural 
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assumptions. Second, employment of an ANOVA requires an exogenous 
sample frame and random treatment  assignment. Third, if  cost con- 
straints or technicaUpolitica1  constraints make a random sample frame 
infeasible, then exogenous stratification on predicted endogenous vari- 
ables is preferable to endogenous stratification. Fourth, the problems of 
balking and attrition can be handled by  straightforward methods for 
random designs, but are greatly complicated by endogenous designs. I 
will comment on each of  these conclusions in turn. 
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An ANOVA Model Is Desirable 
I heartily endorse the criterion of  designing experiments so that a 
simple, direct, robust statistical model like ANOVA can be used. The 
authors go on to argue that policy questions can be answered best by 
measuring the effects of  a few treatments precisely  and using simple 
linear interpolation between treatments. There are several objections to 
this view. First, some cases exist where policy is clearly focused on the 
response surface rather than on specific treatments-an  example is the 
interest in cross-price elasticities in electric time-of-day pricing experi- 
ments. ANOVA with linear interpolation can be viewed as one way of 
fitting a response surface. Another way is higher-order interpolation,  or 
splines. A third way is a traditional structural model, with maintained 
structural  hypotheses providing the smoothing. What is best in this range 
depends on the application.  A final  comment  concerns the authors’ 
concentration on first-order treatment effects: Second-order interactions 
of treatments with concomitant variables such as age and education may 
also be of strong policy interest-economy  may require some structural 
hypotheses in specifying these interactions. 
ANOVA Models Require an Exogenous Sample Frame 
and Random Treatment Assignment 
Hausman and Wise do not distinguish carefully the screening phase of 
an experiment from the treatment-assignment phase. When this distinc- 
tion is made, it is clear that the key to the use of the ANOVA model is 
random treatment assignment, conditioned on the experimental subject 
pool. This is true no matter what sample frame is  used to obtain the 
experimental subject pool. Random treatment assignment creates  a “cor- 
don sanitaire” which isolates the effects of endogenous sampling, balks, 
and pre-experimental attrition. 
This observation has several important implications. First, the value of 
random treatment assignment should be emphasized. This method per- 
mits estimation of  treatment and interaction effects by simple ANOVA 
or COVA methods with  minimal  structural assumptions  and isolates 
sample biases introduced by endogenous sampling, balks, and attrition. 
Second,  with random treatment assignment, there is no need to require 
exogenous sampling. Then endogenous sampling may be a useful tool for 
reducing experiment cost and meeting technical and political constraints. 
One loses only simple consistent estimators of  main and concomitant 
variable effects, which are unlikely to be important for policy analysis. 
(See note at end of  “Comment.”) 
Exogenous Stratification on Predicted Endogenous Variables 
Is Preferable to Endogenous Stratification 
Ceteris paribus,  exogenous stratification leads to simpler and more 
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choice. The Hausman-Wise suggestion of  using an exogenous surrogate 
for endogenous  sampling is a good one. There are two caveats. First, the 
cost economies from endogenous stratification may not be obtainable 
using  a  surrogate. For example,  in  a study of  locational  choice, the 
primary economies in sampling come from actual geographical stratifica- 
tion. Even a good surrogate  for actual location requires a different, more 
costly, method of  contacting subjects. 
Second,  the whole issue of exogenous versus endogenous stratification 
becomes blurred when the experiment is used for different policy pur- 
poses. For example, exogenous stratification, by location in an exper- 
iment  on the effects  of  housing  subsidies on consumption patterns, 
becomes endogenous when  location  decisions are a subject of  policy 
questions. 
Problems of  Balking and Attrition Have 
Straightforward Solutions for Random Sample Frames, 
but Are Greatly Complicated by Endogenous Designs 
The above discussion emphasizes that random treatment assignment 
isolates biases  introduced  by  balking  and  attrition  in  the pre-exper- 
imental phase. This simplification is both substantial and desirable. It 
does not require an exogenous sample frame. 
Even with random treatment assignment, attrition in the experimental 
phase can introduce bias, due to E(TE  I  complete observation) # 0. With 
maintained  structural hypotheses,  this bias can be corrected by max- 
imum-likelihood  methods of  the sort outlined by Hausman and Wise. 
Alternative methods are to estimate 
Y=p+Ta+(Tx  X)y 
+ Xp + E(E  I  complete observation)  + q 
by NLLS or a multi-step Amemiya-Heckman procedure, or to introduce 
regressors spanning E(E  I  complete observation). All these methods tend 
to be distribution-specific, with the last method being least so. If  the 
sample frame is endogenous or there are pre-experimental  balks  or 
attrition, then the conditional distribution of E will be more complex and 
will be influenced by the structure of these effects, as the authors claim. 
The difference is quantitative, but not qualitative, in the complexity of 
model specification and estimation. Since pre-experimental balks or  attri- 
tion  force this problem even for exogenous sample frames, I do not 
consider this a strong argument against endogenous sampling. 
Balking and attrition  are potential  sources of  severe bias in social 
experiments and require careful treatment. It is worthwhile to attempt to 
correct these biases, even at the cost of additional structural hypotheses 
and the loss of  simple ANOVA methods. I believe the focus of further 
research  on  social  experimental  methodology  should  be  on robust 
methods for correcting self-selection biases. 218  Jerry A. HausmadDavid A. Wise 
Note 
COVA Model: Y = p. + Ta  + Xp  + (T  @X)y  +  E. 
T=  Treatment-dummy vector 
X=  Commitment variables 
TO  X = Second-order interactions 
p = Main effect 
a = Treatment effects 
p = Concomitant variable effects 
y = Interaction effects 
Endogenous sample frame and/or endogenous refusal or attrition =>  E(E  I X,  experimental 
sample pool)  # 0. 
Random treatment assignment  =>E(T I X,E)  = 0. 
RESULTS: 
1. Random treatment assignment =>  treatment and interaction effects can be estimated 
consistently from the regression Y = p. + Ta + (T  OX)  y + 1,  or treatment effects alone 
from the regression Y = p.  + Ta + q. 
Exogenous  determination  of  the  experimental  sample  pool,  i.e., E(E  I  X, ex- 
perimental sample pool) = 0, and exogenous treatment assignment =>  treatment, con- 
comitant variable, and interaction effects can be estimated consistently from the regression 
2. 
Y = I*.  +  Ta + xp  + (T0X)y  + E. 
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